Sri Lanka-From Here to Eternity - by Mr. Gomin Dayasri
Sri Lanka may win the battle against Tamil Tigers but not the war as “they have’nt got the Tamils on their side -N.K.Narayan, National Security Advisor ( India).
India neither could defeat the Tamil Tigers nor get the Tamils on their side when the IPKF was around in the North and East. Defeated on both fronts in despair they left. Can Sri Lanka do both or undo the gallant work of the armed forces who have sacrificed so much?
An expression by the National Security Advisor but there is more to it –it reflects more the hopes of India than the thoughts of India. Yet it carries a message which needs to be addressed. The grievances of the Tamils require responses. It is not only the Tamils but should include other minorities together with the Sinhalese who are a provincial minority in two provinces, all of whom have exclusive grievances. Importantly, are they legitimate grievances? If so, it is imperative that relief must be forthcoming without hindrance.
It is not only the Tamils who face problems, so do the Muslims and the Sinhalese whom Narayan’s India has forgotten because they do not have a constituency such as the Tamil Nadu which props any cause of their brethren across the Palk Strait irrespective of the leadership they profess whether federalism or terrorism. Politically, Narayan has to pamper Tamil Nadu to keep the Congress in office, yet mindful that if secession tendencies succeed in Sri Lanka, central government of India will be in peril as it will serve as an impetus for their own terrorist and separatist movements, which are proliferating presently. India’s prescriptions for the neighbors are always primarily in the interest of India yet it contains a worthwhile message. Though most of the problems are endemic to all communities, after a 30 year war to display good faith of a caring majority the legitimate grievances of the minorities require priority attention in a nation building exercise. The Sinhala majority should give leadership to achieve these objectives to convince the Tamils of their sincerity.
It is the Sinhalese leadership that must be in the forefront of the struggle to attend to the legitimate grievances of the minorities, after the annihilation of the terrorists. It would be an ideal rejoinder to the cries of federalism which can lay the seeds to futuristic secession movements that will once again surface after the defeat of the present terrorists to breed fresh terrorism. Grievances of the minorities can be addressed forthwith without the tinkering of Constitution which is an impossibility to amend with provisions dealing with 2/3 majorities and a referendum. Therefore a pragmatic and a priority approach are paramount.
Tamils have watched the situation sitting on the fence to see who may win the final battle. True, many of the innocent Tamil people in the Wanni region are captive in the hands of the LTTE who manipulate them to suit their agenda. Majority of the Tamils preferred to live with the Sinhalese with whom they have many common identities or seek residence abroad, rather than under the yoke of the terrorists. Over the years they learnt life was more secure and comfortable with the Sinhalese than under the terrorists. They had no love for any government or terrorist but willing to switch allegiance to which ever side that emerges triumphantly for their own betterment. Those who went abroad desired to return triumphantly and supported the LTTE displaying the traditional expatriate mentality of “returning nobodies attempting to be some bodies” in their visionary state of Elam. A telling characteristic was that the Tamils escaped from the clutches of the LTTE wherever possible to emigrate abroad or live with the Sinhalese. Still they cheered whenever the LTTE defeated the predominantly Sinhala dominated armed forces from afar, as being of common Dravidian stock (just as much as they would at the cinema for a hero) but cared not to live beside them- understandably it was toss up in a head or tails situation. Now that the security forces are forging ahead, few Tamils openly support the terrorists. Colombo’s elite society is no different; but more opportunistic. Tamils were under an element of duress, which the decadent Colombo’s commercial interests cannot plead in defense. Unless India’s intelligence services sourced, that the days of Prabhakaran were numbered, Narayan would not have gone the distance.
Our governments of the past and present - for which the Sinhalese voted overwhelmingly - have to share the blame. With the politicization of the administration from 1972, merit gave way to sycophancy and created a class of administrators who worked to the dictates of the political authority to whom priority was their electorate. They neither identified the legitimate grievances of the minorities nor found solutions for the identified grievances. Worse, they have not given effect to the language provisions which are enshrined in statutes making it unquestionably a legitimate grievance. If there was insufficient funding, surely foreign financial and logistic assistance could have been sought and it would have been forthcoming. The prima facie the grievances of the Tamils can be identified but it requires attention as to their legitimacy which must be determined so that reliefs flow to the genuinely deprived. Otherwise as in the case of the Indian estate Tamils- the party they voted for held Cabinet portfolio under each successive government from 1977, unique in our political annals- but beneficiaries have been the CWC leadership and not the estate Tamils. It is a classic case of a community under the captivity of a monopolistic single party where relief does not percolate down to the people.
The identified itemized minority grievances as reflected in the experts committee report are as follows:-
- 1.Failure to implement language provisions enshrined in the law
- 2.Security Concerns
- 3Acquistion of Land
- 4.Land and Water
- 5.Child Recruitment
- 6.Lack of development
- 7.Multi ethnic defense and police force
- 8 Lack of Employment opportunities
- 9Rehabilitation of internally displaced persons
- 10 Inadequate infrastructural benefits
The majority of the grievances are common to all communities though there are some which attract only the minorities.
It is probable that after the defeat of the LTTE militarily, all those who opposed terrorism will have divergent views in settling the national issue. There would be many in the ranks of those leading the fight against terrorism with words who will desire to impose a federal solution Those who are tacitly assisting the terrorists with foreign funding will settle for a federal structure as a comfortable stepping stone to revive separatism. To them if Elam is not possible today, they will look to an Elam for the future and construct a road map that will lead to a distant Elam. Presently knowing that Elam via Prabhakaran is a faded dream with the terrorists losing ground on all fronts- no more homage will be paid to the sun god and he would soon be disposable. His foreign aided local sponsors would now maintain a temporary low profile and search for issues in the interim such as corruption and good governance to come clean from the muck and dirt acquired on backing losing issues and unearth a leadership that will be amenable for their accommodation from where they can launch a campaign to usher the seeds of federalism. The realignment of the divergent groups may arise where common enemies will become common friends in the name of federalism. Search has to be for a new leader acceptable to India and the International Community knowing well the UNP in the present form cannot win the electorate. Presently, the Leader of the Opposition is more in peril than the Head of State in a possible ouster by the same forces that once brought him to power. With the defeat of the terrorists, to survive they have to strike fast and the immediate objective is the Leader of the Opposition the softest target for dismissal.
The prime issue is to ensure whatever solution is reached on the national issue, no legacy be kept alive for the revival of terrorism in the future. To do that requires reasonably satisfied minorities who have reasonable confidence in the government- basic requirement is, immediate action by the government to win hearts and mind of the minorities on fast delivery that brings satisfaction and not mere empty words and political fanfare to satisfy cahoots. Terrorism is a lurking fear in every country and can never be totally eliminated but there is an area where road blocks can be introduced to ensure that terrorism can be halted by legitimate means swiftly; by enabling constitutional and statutory provisions to halt a resurrection of terrorism and such preventive methods to eliminate terrorism if it surfaces again. J.R.Jayawardane bequeathed the Eastern Province to the terrorists; Premadasa provided arms ammunition money cement and shelter to the terrorists; Chandrika Kumaranatunga created financial structures with the PTOMS to fund the terrorists; Ranil Wickremasinghe gifted the CFA to the terrorists to strengthen themselves to launch more terrorist attacks on the State - so it only entrenched provisions that will stand as a guarantee to the State in a fight against terrorism in the future. If a federal constitution was installed such as envisaged in the 2000 Bill of Chandrika Kumaranatunga it would have been the launching pad for Prabhakaran to usher the State of Elam. It contains the ingredients to sow the seeds of secession.
Like it or hate it-Sri Lanka has to live with the 13 th Amendment. India has realized it more than Sri Lanka as the architects of the legislation. With the experience of 19 years the Provincial Council system has proved to be a colossal failure yet it cannot be jettisoned due to an unworkable amending procedure. Still more in its reintroduction no room should be left for the resurrection of a rebellion and harmful provisions has to be cushioned. Nevertheless the grievances of the minorities cannot be assuaged with constitutional or legal provisions as experienced-it will satisfy only the political authorities or international community or aspiring terrorists. It requires for its fulfillment political will, necessary legislative instruments, speedy executive directives, judicial support, administrative integrity and ingenuity, a caring majority and a considerate minority.
The satisfaction of the grievances will directly reach the People while devolution alone will enhance powers acquired by politicians and how much will trickle down to the constituents is doubtful. Provincial Council and the conduct of the candidates at elections is a sufficient illustration. Naturally politicians will seek devolution for their own enhancement. However if grievances are eliminated or reduced, the minorities as individuals, will be satisfied their needs have received attention and leaves less room for another Prabhakaran to emerge. Devolution alone can breed more Valatharaja Perumals and his legion of Ministers with a declaration of an independent state especially in defense related matters such as police powers and right to state lands for defense purposes which are necessary instruments to abort separatism. Therefore 13 th Amendment must be implemented taking into consideration time frames and security concerns mindful that terrorism has yet not being eradicated. Grievances must be on a faster track than devolution.
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The ACF Report: Unfolding the Untold Story. By Mr. Gomin Dayasri
A damning report has been issued by Action Contra Farm (ACF) a French based NGO which employed the 17 workers who were killed in Mutur in early August 2006 against Sri Lanka - titled “Muttur Massacre: a Struggle for Justice”. This is emblematic of reports originating from some foreign funded NGO outfits which are packed with inspired tales slanted with spin and swerve. The noteworthy characteristic is the role played by the ACF before and after the death of the 17 workers. Here is the unfolding of the untold story.
This article proposes to deal with extracts from the chapter titled “Facts surrounding the Killing” in the ACF Report but does not propose to deal presently with the other Chapters in the Report as there is an ongoing inquiry and the recording of evidence before a Commission of Inquiry which is a quasi judicial proceeding .However the attacks launched on the Commission and the Attorney General will be dealt briefly.
The writer together with S.L. Gunasekera has already placed articles in the public realm (A) on the unbecoming conduct of the IIGEPs ( who left Sri Lanka discrediting themselves after trying to discredit Sri Lanka) (B) on the exercise by the Commission to seek financial contributions from interested foreign embassies/agencies to video conferencing evidence from abroad- which was disallowed due to the timely intervention by the President as Sri Lanka provides the necessary funding on video conferencing methodology proposed by the Commission was suspended and required to be conducted according to the provision of the law consistent with the admission of such evidence) and (C) on the presence of a inquirer(Commissioner) who was a core staff member of a interested party appearing before the Commission (who tendered his resignation before a ruling could be made after tendering an explanation which was sought by the appointing authority-in fairness to the Commissioner Nesiah no personal allegations were made against him relating to his integrity ; the objection was purely on a legal principle- that no man can be a judge in his own cause and the likelihood of bias in the circumstances).
Now with the ACF publishing a report ‘requesting an international investigation’, the time has dawned to unmask the ACF.
Background
Action Contra Farm(ACF) is a French based NGO which was present in Sri Lanka attending to tsunami relief work and maintained a head office situated in Colombo including a district office in Trincomalee and a smaller unit office in Mutur. It was in the Mutur office premises that 17 workers attached to the ACF met with their death presumed to be in the early hours of 4 th of August 2006.They lived in the office premises at Mutur due to the ongoing conflict..
Mutur town was in the control of the Government of Sri Lanka until the night of the 1 st of August when the LTTE after a comprehensive defeat in nearby Mavil Aru launched an attack and gained control of the Mutur town on the 2 nd of August and held the town for several days until they were ousted.
ACF sent 17 workers to Mutur who were found in their Mutur office when the LTTE launched the assault on the night of the 1 st of August. The LTTE attack was launched initially at the Kattaparrichan Army camp away from the Mutur Town on the road to Sampur which was under LTTE control, at the Navy detachment at the Jetty away from the Town area and at the Police station at the edge of the Town and the several police posts situated in the town area. ACF office was in the centre of the Mutur town.
ACF at the Commission
When the public sittings commenced on the 3 rd of March 2006 before the Commission, the Army marked its appearance through counsel Gomin Dayasri; an Assistant of the IIGEPs Mr Urban a Queens Counsel made an application for an adjournment on the basis that Mr Ratnavale the “presumed” counsel for the ACF was not present and he was engaged in another case in the Magistrate Court in Mutur and sought an adjournment of the proceedings.
The observations of the Commission were as follows;-
“Mr Chairman:
Now Ratnavale did’nt make that application if he said that he is not here today I am unable to be present he could have done that, Mr Ratnavale has never appeared in this Commission.
Mr Urban:
That’s true if he could be here then perhaps wouldn’t need to abide an adjournment but he is not here and certainly within the power and discretion of the Commission perhaps due to the seriousness of this nature to adjourn the matter until tomorrow when Mr Ratnavale can be here”( extract from the proceedings)
This shows that ACF through lawyers or otherwise had not sought representation before the Commission on the opening date of the public sittings but the IIGEPs representative was seeking an adjournment on behalf of the ACF. The foreign IIGEPs cannot, as independent observers, make applications on behalf of ONE interested party if they are truly independent. Here was an Assistant to the IIGEPs with or without instructions from the ACF (which he failed to disclose) making an application on behalf of the ACF, an interested party for an adjournment of the sittings of which public notice was given by the Commission in daily newspapers. How did Mr Urban know that ACF was to be represented by Mr Ratnavale unless there were earlier communications between the ACF and IIGEPs and the appearance by Mr Ratnavale on behalf of the ACF in the future before the Commission, was known to Mr Urban? Mr Urban made no such application on behalf of the Police who are an affected party which was known to him on the recording of statements of witnesses before the Commission under clause 8 since the IIGEPs were present at those sessions. This reveals the conduct of the IIGEPS and their biased partial approach towards the ACF and whether they were in fact truly independent as they pretend to hold out?
This is further revealed in the observations of Commissioner Mr Javid Yusuf at the sittings:
“ Mr Yusof:
Mr Urban, now Mr Ratnavale has not appeared before us and as you said that he is counsel for ACF, he may be counsel for ACF in Mutur case, we don’t know whether he has been retained by ACF to appear before the Commission we have the practice that lawyers are retained for different purposes, may be Mr Ratnavale if he was retained may have advised himself that he does’nt have to be present today. Since you are making a submission on behalf of Mr Ratnavale I don’t see how the Commission can take cognizance of that because you see merely on your interpretation if he{should read “we”} take action that we should put it off one of the criticisms of the IIGEP is making about the Commission is that we are delaying proceedings, now you are asking us to postpone on the belief that Mr Ratnavale might want to appear before us we have no information on that surely’. [extract from the proceedings]
MR Urban had to admit at this stage he is not making an application on behalf of Mr Ratnavale. Since Mr Urban appears to be interested in the ACF only, if he was a balanced unbiased impartial observer in terms of international norms and standards as he sought to maintain, how did he fail to make an application behalf of other affected parties but only in respect of the ACF?
“Mr Premaratne:
The international norms require the counsel who represent the client present before the inquiry to make the application if necessary, he has so far not made an application’[extract from the proceedings].
The next date was cancelled as Mr Bagwathie the Chairman of the IIGEPs sought a meeting with the Commission for that date and the counsel for the ACF Mr Ratnavale marked his appearance for the ACF with junior counsel Mr Samsudeen at the next date of sittings and the Commission rightly recognized ACF as an interested party. Though even a junior counsel was retained by the ACF he did not appear before the Commission on the relevant date to make an application for an adjournment and Mr Urban the IIGEP’s Queens Counsel took upon himself to make an application purportedly on behalf of the ACF. Surely if the senior Counsel was not available, the junior counsel could make an application for an adjournment if retained instead of Mr Urban. It appears from such conduct that the IIGEPs and the ACF were on an orchestrated course of action with a common objective
Contents in the Report
The report states “ A fall back plan of moving the 17 staff members to an internally displaced persons camp was also considered by the ACF, however the stranded staff members told the ACF that it would not be possible for them to leave the office due to constant shelling”.
According to the evidence narrated by the relatives of the deceased, the deceased were made captive in the office of the ACF with instructions not to leave the office by their superiors in Trincomalee and the deceased informed their relatives on the phone of their sad plight.
Evidence reveals(names withheld at the request of the Commission).A relative of the deceased described the state of affairs in the Mutur ACF office as narrated by his deceased relative on the phone and the instructions given by the ACF office in Trincomalee to them-
“Food arrangements have been made by the office so we have no problem about the food, they asked us not to leave the office because if we leave the office it is difficult for them to trace us so we were asked to stay in the office itself” [extract of the proceedings]
So though the ACF holds out in their report their staff at Mutur who met with their death told them it would not be possible for them to leave the office due to constant shelling. it was in fact the ACF who held them captive at the Mutur office for their own convenience because “they asked us not to leave the office because if we leave the office it is difficult for them to trace us so we were asked to stay in the office itself.” [ previous extract highlighted]
Watch how the ACF is indulging in spin and swerve to safeguard themselves from blame? For the easy convenience of the ACF officers of tracing their employees notwithstanding the dangers of remaining in the office of the ACF in Mutur, they insisted they remained in the office in Mutur where they met with their unfortunate death. .However the ACF maintain a false front in the Report not disclosing the truth which is revealed in the evidence.
Furthermore there is evidence of the relative of the deceased on what their dead relative told on the phone-“He said that they were frightened to stay there” and explained the cause of the fear as “ …the people had all evacuated the places so we were alone in the office” [Extracts from the proceedings]. So notwithstanding the fears entertained by the employees in Mutur the ACF compelled them to stay in the office and then gave spin and swerve in the Report to misrepresent the facts that the staff did not want to leave the office This is typical of the standards maintained by the “double speak” of the so called good Samaritans- the foreign NGOs when they submit reports adverse to Sri Lanka.
When the workers sought permission from the ACF office to proceed to refugee camps was refused by the ACF which operated from Trincomalee by a newly arrived dark skinned French official by the name of Mr Komo who was unaware of local situation as narrated by the relatives of the deceased.
“At one stage he{deceased} said that they were also thinking of going to the Church for safety but they contacted the ACF Office and when they asked the ACF Office they had replied back stating that they should continue to stay in the office so that they will be collected them and if they go out, leave the office, they will find it difficult when they are scattered”[extract from the proceedings]It is obvious spin and swerve when the ACF Report states the exact opposite to the evidence on the record to save their skin to overcome their lapses of negligence which led to the death of 17 workers. The report states
“however the stranded staff members told the ACF that it would not be possible for them to leave the office due to constant shelling”
A relative of the deceased stated specifically
“Q. So what happened was that the ACF office in Trincomalee had requested them to remain in the ACF office in Mutur rather than go to a refugee camp?
A. Yes.”[ extract from the proceedings]
It must be stated that people had died in refugee camps also.
The 17 workers were scared to remain in the office as the evidence shows the hospital which was next to the ACF office was shelled by the LTTE and the doctors and staff together with the patients deserted the Mutur hospital immediately through fear. ACF office was next door to the hospital.
There is evidence on record that all those in the refugee camps were shepherded to safety from Mutur by Muslim prelates, Christian priests and high public officials to Kantalai and Trincomalee in the vehicles of the International Red Cross and a tractor from the Church.and on foot. Neither the Forces nor the LTTE disturbed any person fleeing Mutur and according to the evidence all those who left Mutur reached safe sanctuaries. However it is in evidence there was a Land Rover and two cabs in the ACF office with 3 drivers (who died) in the office of the ACF in Mutur at the relevant time without being used to take the 17 workers to safety. Why did ACF not use these vehicles with drivers in attendance to move their workers to safe ground? There was transport moving on the streets of Mutur during the period according to evidence, even bicycles and motorcycles.
“Q. You said already in your evidence that it is the ACF office who had instructed them to remain in the office without going to any refugee camp because there was difficulty in collecting them?
A. Yes.’[extract from the proceedings]
The obvious negligence or lack of duty of care is on the part of the ACF but more disgusting aspect is the attempt to cover their tracks and shift the blame on all others especially Sri Lanka as revealed in the Report by the foreign NGO.
The cat is out of the bag in the Report. These were decisions taken by the ACF in Colombo and Paris. As the report states
“A decision was taken in Colombo and the Paris to request all staff members to remain in the ACF office until the fighting ceased”
Probably as testified by the relatives of the deceased it is to enable an easy pick up of the employees for the easy collection and the inconvenience for the ACF if they were scattered in several refugee camps to collect them-so a decision was made in Colombo and Paris with or without wisdom to the detriment of the deceased workers to confne them to the office in Mutur. As testified by a relative of the deceased
“Foreigners will not have that opportunity for seeing the incidents, it is only the local people will know what is happening”. [ extract from the proceedings]
There is the evidence of a prelate of a denominational religion in Mutur and senior public servant (names withheld at the request of the Commission) who had instructed the workers at the ACF camp to leave their premises and move to the…..(religious site withheld], and their response was the instructions from their head office was not to leave the premises.
“Q. And when you advised them to accompany you at least 4 female employees to accompany you to ….[name of religious premises withheld] how did they respond?
A. They said very sorry….. [designation of prelate withheld] we are bound by the orders from the headquarters so we cant do that. [extract from the proceedings]
A similar plea was made by a senior public servant but it did not move the workers from the office, due to such instructions.
The bewildering fact is that in the entirety of the report of the ACF they have withheld (a) such an order been made (b) that it was in view of the orders of the CFA the 17 workers remained in the ACF office. Instead ACF Report states “… the stranded staff members told the ACF that it would not be possible for them to leave the office due to the constant heavy shelling”
The prelates evidence was corroborated by the relatives of the deceased namely that the workers should remain in the premises were the instructions given by the ACF office which ACF are now embarrassed to admit realizing their culpability and the possible strictures by the Commission. So the strategy is to attack the Commission of Inquiry, its procedures and its officials to devalue the Commission before becoming devalued
In a capsulated form, this is typical of the publications by these NGO’s distorting the truth.
Disappearance of the ACF
The disappearance of the ACF from the sittings of the Commission was more bizarre than their appearance. After the relatives and friends of the deceased gave unfavorable evidence against the ACF on 7 th April 2008 Mr Ratnavale declared he is no longer appearing for the ACF as the ACF had ceased all operation in Sri Lanka and ACF informed him they will not be taking any further part in the proceedings.
“ Commissioner Mr Yusuf stated
So at the crucial time when the case is being inquired into we would like to have
their presence. It is rather funny for them to leave at this point of time.
Mr Ratnavale
The decision was taken by them and they stated the decision came from the head office so I have no control over it.
Mr Yusuf
I know you are not a party to that decision but it strikes me rather unusual when they should be present to ensure this case is brought to its proper fruition.
Mr Ratnavale
That is so”
So agreed the former counsel of the ACF. Mr Ratnavale ceased to be counsel for the ACF and remained as counsel for a relative of a deceased.
ACF came into the case on the application of the IIGEP Assistant Mr Urban and deserted without tendering a reason to the Commission.. If the ACF was interested in ascertaining the truth they would have remained but the reason for their departure could be the adverse evidence that was laid on their doorstep by the relatives of the deceased in their testimonies. ACF could not face the Truth. They left at a time, when material was surfacing on ACF’s of lack of knowledge of the ground situation in Mutur especially by their foreign staff who were making the decisions on incorrect assessments, of stupid instructions given to their employees in Mutur making them captive in the office at Mutur, of not using the transport available to proceed to safety which reveals negligence and the lack of due care. After acting irresponsibly ACF is now attempting to shift the blame on others by submitting a distorted Report from abroad.
Role of the AG
The ACF report faults “the active participation of the AGs representatives at the hearing of the Commission”. There is no appearance for the Attorney General at the Commission. The evidence is conducted by members of the official and unofficial Bar as the Commission’s selected panel of counsel. It consists of Mr R.K.W. Goonesekera as the lead counsel from the unofficial bar. A respected and eminent counsel, Mr Goonesekera is also the Chairman of Law and Society Trust (as disclosed in their letter head annexed to their written submissions) a party to the proceedings on behalf of the Civil Societies who are watching the humanitarian interests of the deceased. In fact it is an unusual feature, where such a “party interested” is made a party to the proceedings, has its Chairman as the lead counsel with the right to all the material and documentation of the Commission. This demonstrates the so called transparency and the tilt towards the interest of the parties of the civil societies by the Commission. Counsel for the Commission, Mr R.K.W. Goonesekera is featured in a dual role and can guide the Commission from his vantages position for the civil societies as the chairman of a interested party. Instead ACF focuses on the role played by the partners of the official bar who are members of the Attorney Generals department but do not act in such capacity at the Commission but assist the Commission as one of the Lead Counsel. Human Rights groups have been conferred rights not granted to other interested parties such as the Defense Forces at the Commission. ACF blames only the Attorney General who finally has to prosecute an offender. This displays the latitude granted to the civil societies by the Commission which is a beneficial feature from their point of view.
The Commission of Inquiry
Finally the ACF faults the Commission of Inquiry quoting extracts from a report of the IIGEPs. It is ironical that the IIGEPs also left at a time criticism was mounting against their own conduct which they failed to answer. But the significance lies in the omission of the parting words of the Chairman IIGEPs which the ACF conveniently forgot to mention in their Report-
“…so far as the Commission is concerned it has been doing very good work and the members of IIGEP have had the best of cooperation from the Chairman and Members of COI. I have no doubt that COI will continue to carry on its work with zeal and dedication as it has been doing so far”
The value that the ACF attaches or any other should attach to the words of Mr Bagawathie the Chairman of the IIGEPs is debateable but it reveals that both the ACF or the IIGEPs do not tell the frank truth and take contradictory and inconsistent positions and need to be exposed.
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A British Attempt to Rescue the Tigers: A Response
Another Westminster Intervention in the Sri Lankan Conflict
The versions of what transpired at the recent meeting between representatives of the House of Lords and the House of Commons and a delegation of the ‘British Tamil Forum’ (BTF) as reported in the press (including several websites that carry news on Sri Lanka), though varied in content and focus, could be summarised as follows:
The meeting was chaired by Lord Malloch-Brown, the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom. Responding to the BTF submissions, Lord Malloch-Brown expressed concern on both the continuing prosecution by the Sri Lanka government of the war against the LTTE as well as what he perceived as excessive violation of human rights in Sri Lanka. While remaining non-committal on imprecations for imposing trade and travel sanctions and the curtailment of aid to Sri Lanka made by Suren Surendiran (a spokesmen for the BTF) and Gajan Ponnambalam (a Tamil National Alliance parliamentarian of Sri Lanka), Malloch-Brown reiterated his view that there could be no military solution to the “problem” (which problem his lordship had in mind was not made clear), that there should be an all out effort by the international community to persuade the government to resume negotiations, and that Sri Lanka must seek a political solution involving devolution of power to the Tamil areas of the country. Further, he pledged support to the demand being made by Louise Arbour and several other officers of the UN and by certain leaders of the EU for greater intervention of the world body in Sri Lanka for protection of human rights. A contrasting stance was adopted by Lord Naseby (former Conservative Party MP) who, according to Tamilnet, “…denounced the BFT and its views”. Lord Malloch-Brown himself expressed reservations on the parallels which the BTF delegation had attempted to draw between Kosovo and Sri Lanka.
The statements attributed to Lord Malloch-Brown even in the reports carried by pro-LTTE publications cannot, in respect of their substance, be construed as representing a significant change in the stance of the British government vis-à-vis the Sri Lankan conflict. Examined individually, they are no more than repetitions of the same superficial and generalised observations that have been repeatedly made throughout the past few months by representatives of certain government and non-government ‘western powers’ including their Colombo-based representatives and lackeys. Likewise the vehemence discernible in the tone of what was allegedly said by his lordship could be understood in the context of the fact that he is known to be exceptionally self-opinionated. For instance, a ‘Profile’ published by London’s prestigious Sunday Times (18 November 2007) stated: “ Malloch-Brown’s worst enemy is his own big mouth. He lost little time after his appointment to brag of his reputation”, and attributed to him the modest claim: “From Colin Powell to Condi Rice all the way through to Richard Holbrooke or Madeleine Albright, across that massive swathe of American foreign policy, I would bet you a drink that you would find that I am their favourite multi-nationalist Brit”. Thus, one cannot rule out the possibility of his having performed true to form at the meeting with the BTF.
Will this vastly experienced, urbane, “multi-nationalist Brit” ever understand that devolution of power to the “Tamil areas” (presumably, the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka) cannot, by any stretch of imagination, bestow upon the Tamil community of the country greater powers of democratic governance than they exercise at present when more than half of that community lives outside the north-east, and as long as “the most powerful terrorist outfit in the world” (so described by intelligence services of two major western powers) led by a ruthless megalomaniac whose record of heroics include the extermination of almost all political leaders of his own community continues to retain the capacity to enslave through terror and force of arms the remaining segment of that community and other inhabitants of that part of the country? Will Malloch-Brown and others of similar persuasion ever bother to study the Sri Lankan conflict adequately to appreciate the basic fact that it was not the government of Sri Lanka that abandoned the peace efforts initiatives of 2002 and that what the government formally discarded in December 2007 was literally a non-existent ceasefire? When will these great champions of human rights appreciate that serious violations of human rights (killing of non-combatants, abductions, torture, conscription of children for war, ethnic cleansing) constitute nothing other than the essence of Tiger terror; that these occur almost entirely in parts of the country (north-east and Greater Colombo) where the democratically elected government constantly faces the challenge of terrorism; that, even in such areas, there has been a remarkable lowering of the incidence of human rights abuses where the security forces of the government has achieved success in vitiating that challenge; and, above all, that the primary objective of the government’s military offensives has all along been the restoration of democratic governance in Sri Lanka?
It is not possible in this brief response to the reports on the British legislators’ meeting with the BTF to embark upon a comprehensive discussion on the misunderstandings displayed by some among the former and the deliberate distortions engaged in by those of the latter. What could be done, however, is to recapitulate the vicissitudes of the Sri Lankan conflict witnessed since the inception of the presidential tenure of Mahinda Rajapakse, and thus attempt to dispel the myth that it was his government that abandoned the so-called ‘peace efforts’ launched in early 2002 and opted for a military strategy of ending the conflict.
LTTE Challenge to the New President
At the time leading up to the presidential election of November 2005, candidate Mahinda Rajapaksa, while declaring commitment to a search for an ‘honourable peace’, pledged to protect the unitary nature of the Sri Lankan state. He maintained that the peace efforts must involve broad-based participation and not be confined to bilateral negotiations between the government and the LTTE, and rejected both the LTTE claim of being the sole representative of the Tamils of Sri Lanka, as well as the notion of an ‘exclusive Tamil homeland’ comprising the country's Northern and Eastern provinces. On prominent controversies of that time, Rajapaksa stood opposed to both the Norway-authored and LTTE-approved blueprint for an ‘Interim Self-Government Authority’ (ISGA) for the ‘north-east’, as well as President Kumaratunga’s proposals for the establishment of a ‘Post-Tsunami Operations Management Structure’ (P-TOMS), on the grounds that their implementation would bestow official recognition and formal powers of government on the LTTE to the negation of the tenets of democracy. On the frequently violated terms of the government-LTTE ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ of February 2002, Rajapaksa stressed the need to re-negotiate the terms of that agreement. These commitments, while conforming to the policy stances that had been advocated all along by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) — the two parties with which Rajapaksa had entered into electoral agreements at the commencement of his campaign for the presidency — deviated in many respects from those advocated by President Kumaratunga, the leader of his own party.
There is a widespread belief in Sri Lanka that the LTTE leader, Prabhakaran, contributed to Mahinda Rajapaksa’s victory at the presidential election by enforcing a boycott of the poll in the north and parts of the east. In the aftermath of the election, he began to test the resolve of the new president by articulating with intensifying vehemence the earlier LTTE demands for government intervention in disarming the rebel group led by Karuna, and for greater control over post-Tsunami rehabilitation and reconstruction in the north-east. The LTTE leadership also persisted with its efforts at both extending its military control over parts of the Eastern Province as well as provoking the security forces into retaliatory acts of violence. Instigating communal clashes in areas of mixed ethnicity, which it believed was a distinct possibility under the new regime in which the JVP and the JHU stood in high profile, also became part and parcel of the Tiger strategy.
In these latter efforts the LTTE came perilously close to success through a sequence of events the origins of which could be traced back to the immediate aftermath of the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement when it established a network of military bases in the Sampur-Muttur area south of the Trincomalee Bay, from which it launched occasional attacks on military and civilian targets. After March 2004 these bases were also used for its anti-Karuna offensives. Thus, in accordance with the strategy adopted by the LTTE for its onslaught against the new regime, they escalated their levels of violence in the Trincomalee area both by frequent bomb attacks on security forces personnel as well as by killing Karuna group activists. These evoked counterattacks both by the armed forces of the government as well as by the Karuna group. The violence that ensued included a bomb explosion by the LTTE at a crowded market on April 12 at which the majority of victims were Sinhalese civilians and a three-day backlash of homicide, arson and looting in various parts of the town and its suburbs by Sinhalese mobs consisting mainly of the lumpen elements of the town and, allegedly, of military personnel in mufti which caused the death of 20 civilians — 11 Tamils, seven Sinhalese and two Muslims. Over this spell the LTTE also added to its score of homicide a further 16 personnel of the army and the police.
Meanwhile the LTTE extended its offensive to other parts of the country. In what constituted a major attack on the very heart of the country’s security establishment, a suicide bomber blew herself up within the precincts of the army headquarters in Colombo on 25 April 2006 in an attempt to assassinate (and causing near-fatal injury to) the Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka. A month later, a Tiger claymore-bomb attack in a remote poverty-stricken area of the North-Central Province resulted in the wholesale massacre of a bus-load of 64 villagers — many of them, women and children. Again, on 19 June, there was an abortive attempt at an attack on ships berthed in Colombo harbour which, had it succeeded, would have caused large-scale damage to the Sri Lankan economy. A week later, Lt. General Parami Kulatunga, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the army, was assassinated by a suicide bomber.
The intensification of Tiger belligerence in the early months of the new regime should be understood in the context of the remarkable success President Rajapaksa achieved in consolidating his grip over the politics of Sri Lanka’s ‘South’. Though elected to office with a wafer-thin majority, in the first few months of his presidential tenure he succeeded in a way that none of his predecessors had done in achieving a higher level of intra- and inter-party consensus for his approach to the secessionist threat. Within his own party he finessed Kumaratunga in a series of manoeuvres that ended in his own unanimous appointment as president of the PA. The message he repeatedly conveyed to the people was that he remains unswerving in his commitment to the ‘Mahinda Chintanaya’ (ideology) as proclaimed in his election manifesto. It appeared to carry sufficient weight to preserve (despite increasing stresses and strains) the alliance with the JVP and the JHU, and to attract into the ranks of the government the CWC (plantation Tamils) and the SLMC (Muslims, mainly of the ‘south-east’) both of which had supported Wickremasinghe at the presidential election. Indeed, as matters stood up to about April 2006, within the political mainstreams, it was only from the United National Party (UNP) reeling from the effects of successive electoral defeats, and the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) the LTTE proxies in parliament, that the president faced perfunctory and petulant opposition which, of course, he could afford to ignore. Apart from this ‘internal’ consolidation, Rajapaksa appeared to be gaining increasing endorsement and support from those of the ‘international community’ proactive in Sri Lankan affairs, who at the time of the presidential election had left hardly any room to doubt that Ranil Wickremasinghe of the UNP was the man they preferred. On 10 April 2006 the new Conservative Party government of Canada added the LTTE to its list of 38 outlawed terrorist organisations, and followed the ban with raids on the offices of the ‘World Tamil Movement’ (an LTTE ‘front’ outfit) in Montreal, Scarborough and Toronto. About a month later the European Union adopted a resolution recommending the conscription of the LTTE in its member countries. Meanwhile, in the United States, the FBI foiled a large-scale clandestine transaction of arms attempted on behalf of the LTTE, arresting and incarcerating several Tiger agents involved in the deal.
Tiger Offensive and Retaliatory Action
President Rajapaksa’s progress served as a constant reminder of the tactical blunder of the LTTE demigod Prabhakaran who, by preventing the voters of the north and parts of the east from participating at the presidential polls, is likely to have contributed to Rajapaksa’s victory. The LTTE strategy, it may be recalled, was based upon the premise that Wickremasinghe, hailed internationally as the ‘peace candidate’, if elected, would place in serious jeopardy the secessionist cause with his offer of federalism (“Who on earth asked for federalism?”, as the LTTE theoretician Balasingham was to soon argue), and thus make it difficult to sustain its ‘liberation struggle’. Its expectation was that Rajapaksa, if elected, will jettison the existing ceasefire agreement and evict the “White Tigers” (Norwegians) from their role of facilitator of the peace efforts. This, the LTTE leadership believed, would pave the way for a resumption of the military campaign in earnest, backed by vastly enhanced international sympathy and support for their cause. All indications up to this time, however, were that President Rajapaksa’s performance would blast that hope. He and his allies remained conscious that nothing could be gained by negotiating with the Tigers. But they were equally aware that everything could be lost by anything less than a total commitment to the pursuit of peace through negotiation.
It has, in fact, been asserted that the president attempted at this time to initiate a dialogue (kept secret from his main ‘nationalist’ allies?) with the Vanni high-command in order to curtail the rising tensions and lead to a resumption of the peace talks. One could speculate that the exercise of caution and restraint by the president, even at the risk of creating dissention within the government parliamentary group and being charged with violating his election pledges, was intended mainly to preserve the ceasefire so as to keep the doors open for negotiations with the LTTE. Although no progress towards peace had been made at the brief meeting between delegates of the government and the LTTE at Geneva in February 2006, the continuing recalcitrance and belligerence of the LTTE found acknowledgement in the policy stances vis-à-vis Sri Lanka in most countries of the ‘West’.
There was, however, the sharply escalating level of Tiger violence and brinkmanship that could not be ignored. From the time of Rajapaksa’s assumption of the office of president up to the bomb attack on the Army Commander (approximately 150 days), 150 armed services personnel (in addition to about 150 civilians) had been killed. The animosity between the LTTE and the security forces had reached such fever pitch, and the pressure from the JVP and the JHU for some retaliatory measures had become so intense, that the president was compelled to initiate a series of air strikes on identified LTTE bases, especially those located in the Sampur area south of Trincomalee where there had been a LTTE military build-up since mid-2002 in total violation of the ceasefire agreement of that year. The more easily identifiable among such targets were, of course, the beach-side Sea Tiger installations that had all along posed an ominous threat to the government naval base at Trincomalee and served as both conduits for the smuggling of arms across the Bay of Bengal as well as nodes along the maritime link between the Tiger strongholds of the Vanni and those of the eastern lowlands.
The vulnerability of the east coast from perspectives of security was underscored by a Sea Tiger attack on 11 May 2006 on a vessel (‘MV Pearl Cruiser’) transporting about 700 security forces personnel from Trincomalee to Kankesanturai. The vessel was being escorted by a navy convoy and, in accordance with stipulations of the ceasefire agreement, flying the SLMM flag to indicate the presence of Norwegian monitoring officers on board. The attack was successfully repulsed with some losses of men and gun-boats on both sides but with no damage to the troop carrier. It signified, however, a perceptible shift of emphasis by the Tiger leadership towards a display of its maritime power in disregard of whatever response the SLMM and the government of Norway might make in its aftermath. The ‘international community’ (represented, on this occasion not only by the US and the EU but also by the UN General Secretary Kofi Annan) was quick to condemn the attack, especially the endangerment of the lives of SLMM monitors. More importantly, there was a rebuke of the LTTE by Ulf Henricsson, the Head of the monitoring mission, along with his determination that the LTTE’s ‘maritime rights’ off Sri Lanka’s east coast were not unrestricted.
The Tiger response to these strictures reflected, more than all else, the crude arrogance which it had begun to display this time. S P Thamilchelvam, the chief of the LTTE Political Wing, warned the SLMM that members of the monitoring team should avoid being used by the Sri Lanka Navy as ‘human shields’ and should refrain from boarding Sri Lanka navy vessels without prior sanction of the Vanni head-office. He proclaimed that the sovereign rights of the LTTE extend not only over specific stretches of territory but also over the adjacent seas and the air-space. Soosai, the Sea Tiger leader, proceeded further with seemingly inebriated bravado declaring that the LTTE, having sacrificed more that 1,200 Sea Tiger lives in innumerable confrontations with the navies of Sri Lanka and India, and having at its command a large naval fleet, has established control over “…vast stretches of sea off the north-east of the island”, where its operations do not require prior permission from Oslo.
As if to demonstrate the veracity of this claim the Sea Tigers hijacked a Jordanian-registered cargo vessel (‘MV Farah 3’) off the coast of Mullaitivu, abducted its 25-member crew, and plundered the 14,000 mt of rice it had been conveying from India to South Africa. The crew was later released. The ship was dismantled off-shore and its parts taken for use as scrap. ‘Salam International Transport and Trading Company’, the owner of the ship, was indemnified by its insurance firm about a year later. The Sea Tigers thus got off committing a major act of piracy evoking hardly any external reaction other than the formal withdrawal of the SLMM from its maritime duties.
The formation of “people’s militias” which were made to appear as grass-roots organisations consisting of volunteers was one form of preparation for war pursued by the LTTE during this period. Several such outfits had been established in 2005-06 in the Vanni. On 30 June 2006 there was a widely publicised ‘passing-out parade’ conducted at the premises of Sri Senbaga Mahāvidyālaya (‘high-school’) for 6,000 persons drawn allegedly from the peasantry of the Muttur-Ichchilampattu area who had completed their training under the ‘Civilian Volunteer Force’ programme of the LTTE.
In the months that followed, the LTTE, while persisting with the strategy of sporadic acts of violence such as ‘pistol-gang’ killings, suicide-bomber operations, ambushes and claymore-mine explosions in many parts of the island, also launched two major military offensives — one in the Mahaveli delta, south of Trincomalee (Muttur-Mavil Aru area) and the other in the northern peninsula concentrated along the ‘Forward Defence Lines’ between the ‘cleared’ and ‘uncleared’ areas, especially the Muhamalai entry/exit point between the LTTE-controlled Vanni and the government-controlled Jaffna peninsula. These may be sketched out as follows.
Muttur-Mavil Aru Battles
On 20 July 2006 the LTTE closed the anicuit located on Mavil Aru (one of the larger distributaries of the Mahaveli river), thus depriving irrigation water to nearly 30,000 acres of downstream paddy land. This was, indeed, a classic ‘riparian gambit’ — a challenge for a showdown for control over the entire Mahaveli delta, based on the belief of the LTTE leadership that the recovery from the ‘Karuna’ and ‘Tsunami’ setbacks was adequate by this time for its fighting cadres to achieve the twin objectives of evicting not only the security forces of the government but also the Muslim inhabitants from this area. Further, its capture would mean a vast enrichment of the LTTE granary and would also provide the Tiger forces supremacy over the entire coastal area south of the Trincomalee Bay and over a corridor of access between their domain in Vanni and the localities they hold in Batticaloa and Ampara districts.
The LTTE challenge had obviously to be met with a concerted response the ceasefire agreement notwithstanding, if not for holding on to an area the loss of which could have far-reaching repercussions from strategic perspectives, at least for performing the government obligation of defending an innocent farm population. The military counteroffensive, codenamed ‘Operation Watershed’, launched by the security forces on 26 July with the objective of reopening the anicuit and flushing out the LTTE cadres from that locality entailed fierce fighting that lasted about a fortnight and ended with the eviction (‘tactical withdrawal’, according to Thamilchelvam) of the LTTE from the area. Following a tedious process of re-settlement of the civilians displaced by the Muttur-Mavil Aru battle (tedious, mainly because the displaced civilian population was constantly terrorised by the Tigers), and amidst conflicting claims on battle-field victories, defeats and atrocities, the government, in early September 2006, arranged an escorted tour of this entire area for a group of local and foreign journalists, thus dispelling lingering doubts on the final outcome of the confrontations.
Among the diversionary tactics adopted by the Tigers while the Muttur-Mavil Aru battle was in progress was a claymore-mine attack on a military convoy which killed 18 soldiers, and an artillery attack on the government naval base in the Trincomalee harbour killing five sailors. An attempt by a Sea Tiger flotilla to destroy a troop-ship carrying some 850 military personnel on its journey from the northern port of Kankesanthurai to Trincomalee attempted on 1 August was successfully thwarted. In the aftermath of the Muttur-Mavil Aru defeats, the LTTE carried out several sporadic acts of terrorism in Colombo. These included the assassination of Ketheeshwaran Loganathan [scion of a leading Sri Lankan Tamil family, a former member of the EPRLF who had left that group in 1994 at the age of 41, and, in later life, as an active exponent of peace in Sri Lanka, had worked as a Director of the Centre for Policy Alternatives (a research-focused NGO) and was serving in the post of Deputy Secretary of the government ‘Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process’ (SCOPP) at the time of his death] on 12 August 2006; and an assassination attempt by a suicide bomber two days later of the High Commissioner for Pakistan which succeeded in killing four men in the diplomat’s security guard.
Battles along the Northern ‘Forward Defence Line’
The military confrontations that began in August 2006 in the Jaffna peninsula have been much longer in duration and far less conclusive in outcome than those of Muttur-Mavil Aru. There are two versions regarding what impelled the sudden escalation of confrontations in this part of the country. One of these is based mainly on evidence indicating that preparations were being made by the LTTE for a major offensive in Jaffna (launched with the objective of re-establishing its control over the peninsula). For instance, as mentioned above, the LTTE was setting up ‘people’s militias’ (Makkal Padai) given rudimentary training in the use of firearms and techniques of sabotage. It was also engaged in installing caches of weapons within the more densely populated localities of the peninsula. In addition to this evidence, a report dated 15 August 2006 released by the Norwegian Monitoring Mission stated that the LTTE initiated an offensive with mortar fire and cadre intrusions across the Forward Defence Lines (FDL) in the Muhamalai area on 10 August. According to the second version, it was the sudden intensification of aerial bombardment of the north by the Sri Lanka air force that prompted the upsurge of conformational violence in Jaffna peninsula at this time.
Although the Sri Lanka Air Force had conducted a series of air attacks on identified military targets in rebel-held territory in northern Sri Lanka from about mid-April 2006 (after the attempted assassination of the army commander, referred to earlier in this chapter), its attack on 14 August, targeted as it was at the premises of an institution named ‘Sencholai’ in Vallipuram, located on the Paranthan-Mullaitivu road, did represent a definite intensification of its onslaught by air. The bombing resulted in the killing of a large number of young persons (estimated at 51), mostly women. According to the response of the LTTE leadership to this tragic event, the victims were “school-girls undergoing training in First-Aid”. Probably because “training in First-Aid” sounded somewhat paramilitary, a slightly modified version of that response was subsequently issued by a person identifying himself as ‘Director of the Tamil Eelam Educational Board’, according to which the 51 victims (who, he said, had been selected from among orphaned school-children) were engaged in the morning session of a ten-day residential workshop on “Leadership, Self-Awareness and First Aid” at the time they lost their lives. The SLMM team that visited ‘Sencholai’ on the day after the bombing testified that they had seen the bodies of nineteen young women, killed in two localities. The report of these monitors also noted that, although “Sencholai was …a civilian location it was ideal to conduct arms training, (and hence) the monitors are unable to clearly state if (sic.) the location was purely a school or a rebel training facility”.
The most intense among the confrontations in the north took place in the Muhamalai-Kilaly area. Soon after the signing of the Government-LTTE ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ in February 2002, the ‘A9 Highway’, providing the main overland link between Jaffna Peninsula and the rest of the island, was opened for civilian traffic, with the highway stretch traversing the LTTE-held area of the Vanni being subject to regulations by both the government as well as the LTTE at the entry/exit points at Muhamalai located at the northern border of that area and Omanthai at its southern border. The regulations imposed by the LTTE involved, among other things, the extraction of taxes and other levies from vehicles, passengers and goods at these entry/exit points, the daily collection from which was estimated to approximate SLR 1 million. Moreover, Muhamalai also facilitated access from the Vanni to Jaffna peninsula and, hence, a point of easy infiltration of LTTE cadres into the latter area. With escalating levels of violence in 2006, the government closed the ‘A9’, causing both a huge loss of revenue to the LTTE as well as an obstacle to its building up strength in the government-controlled northern peninsula. Following the closure of ‘A9’, Muhamalai, on account of its vulnerability to LTTE attacks, had been developed by the government as an important military base. Thus, the attack on Muhamalai and other FDL (such as those south and west of Jaffna town) in Jaffna peninsula begun on 11 August was seen as a prelude to an attempt by the LTTE to recapture the peninsula from which it had been evicted in December 1995.
The other flashpoints were along the FDL south and southwest of the Jaffna city where the LTTE had established beachheads in the islands of Kayts and Mandativu. The Nagarkovil area of Thenmarachchi (coastal sandbar on the eastern periphery of the peninsula) also became the scene of fierce military resistance of Tiger infiltration towards Point Pedro and other towns along the peninsula’s northern coast. In the Muhamalai-Kilaly area, after some initial success in halting the intrusion, the government troops are reported to have ventured out on 10 September in an ill-planned counteroffensive intended to destroy the staging posts from which the LTTE attacks were being launched. While engaged in this attempt, they were entrapped in a ferocious guerrilla onslaught in the course of which many soldiers (28, according to an estimate in South Asia Intelligence Review of 28 October 2006) lost their lives. Thereafter, with replenishments of men and arms, the security forces did manage to hold the Tigers at bay along all FDL of the Jaffna peninsula in a long drawn-out stalemate featured by fluctuating fortunes on both sides. In the more recent past, there has been a shift of confrontational gravity to the FDL localities in the hinterland of Mannar.
LTTE Air Attacks
One of the most widely publicised LTTE military offensives of this period took the form of two low-flying aircrafts — Czech-manufactured Ziln 143 single-engined trainers — proceeding south from a jungle hideout in the northern plains, dropping 3 bombs on Sri Lanka’s principal air-force base at Katunayake at approximately 1.00 a.m. on Monday, 26 March 2006, and returning unharmed to its base an hour later. Two of the bombs exploded, killing three airmen and injuring about 15 others of the engineering section of the airbase. According to post-attack official reports, the Israel-built Kfirs and the Ukranian Mig 27s (constituting the main fighter squadrons of the air-force) on which the bombing raid is believed to have been targeted escaped damage.
Undeterred by this, however, the LTTE persisted in demonstrating its air strike capability in supporting a ground attack launched about seven months later on the second largest airbase in the country located at the southern periphery of Anuradhapura. It began at about 3.00 a.m. on 22 October 2007 with a group of LTTE cadres infiltrating the airbase. The group, carrying assault weaponry, soon brought under its control certain installations (including several gun emplacements) within the base, caused damage to aircraft and equipment, and, until about dawn, held on to a large part of the base killing several air force personnel and driving the others into defensive positions. Following the initial success of this commando-style raid, two low-flying light aircraft belonging to the LTTE arrived at the scene, dropped several bombs and returned to their base in the ‘Vanni’. Meanwhile, the air force incurred an additional loss in the form of one of its transport helicopters crashing at a spot about 13 km north of the airbase, the reasons for which are yet to be unravelled. The counterattack by the security forces, led evidently by soldiers of the Gajaba Regiment of the Sri Lanka Army, began in earnest soon after sunrise and re-established control of the airbase by mid-morning. The death-toll of this battle according to government sources was 21 Tigers (all participants in the raid) and 13 persons attached to the air force. LTTE statements refer to 21 of its cadres ‘missing in action’.
Turn of the Tide: LTTE Losses
Following the eviction of the Tigers from the Muttur-Mavil Aru area, the security forces maintained the momentum of victory to advance towards the coastal lowlands of Batticaloa District which, by November 2006, had emerged as the most powerful Tiger domain in the east. The principal objective of this operation was the rescue of the civilian population entrapped (as recounted by escapees to the government-controlled areas) under the harshly repressive LTTE rule since April 2004 when the ‘Karuna faction’ withdrew from the area. At the commencement of the military campaign here, its planners believed that the army will encounter resistance from about 3,000 well-armed Tiger cadres.
By late March 2007 the LTTE base at Vakarai had been destroyed, and the SL Army had established its control in the entire area adjacent to the Uppar Lagoon, launched soon thereafter a programme of resettlement of the displaced civilians. Almost simultaneously, the Tigers suffered another major defeat when Kokkadacholai (located a few miles south of Batticaloa town, and one of their foremost command centres in the east) was overrun by the army which, in the process, also recovered a large haul of weapons. Despite continuing attrition by the Tigers — the suicide attack on the army camp at Chenkaladi, north of Batticaloa on 27 March, causing the death of about 20 soldiers was probably the most destructive among such attacks — by early April, the LTTE hold over the coastal areas of Batticaloa had been shattered, and the surviving Tiger cadres driven to the interior of the district. Meanwhile, in the face of heavy losses in encounters with the police ‘Special Task Force’ in the Ampara littoral, LTTE cadres operating in that area also withdrew to the interior of Batticaloa. Here, despite the enhanced threat from hit-and-run attacks by those of the Karuna faction, the Vanni leadership probably believed that, especially in the rugged terrain surrounding the Thoppigala crag, developed over many years as a supposedly impregnable fortress, their cadres would find sanctuary from which they could regroup to launch a massive counterattack. Such a turn of fortunes failed to materialise, and, by mid-July 2007, the security forces had effective control over the entire Batticaloa and Ampara districts.
Losses of almost unprecedented magnitude were suffered by the LTTE in the encounters in the Eastern Province. According to SL Army estimates, since the commencement of the ‘Mavil Aru blockade’ of July 2006 up to the fall of Thoppigala almost an year later, the LTTE losses included 718 confirmed battle-field deaths, about 700 who surrendered to the army, and several hundreds seriously wounded. In addition, there had also been many LTTE recruits from the Batticaloa area who had simply abandoned arms and returned to civilian life.
These ‘terrestrial’ setbacks of the LTTE were paralleled by equally severe ‘maritime’ losses. A rough impression of their scale is conveyed by the fact that, since January 2006, the Sri Lanka navy had destroyed and/or intercepted nine transoceanic arms shipments of the LTTE, in addition to many smaller vessels engaged in transporting contraband across the Palk Strait which, despite strengthened preventive measures, has continued to remain one the more porous international frontiers of South Asia. The largest, by far, in the category of maritime losses was reported on 11 September 2007 when the SL Navy apprehended and destroyed three cargo vessels carrying arms and explosives for the LTTE in a mid-ocean battle about 600 nautical miles off the east coast of Sri Lanka. On 8 October yet another vessel, conveying a large consignment of military hardware to the LTTE was set ablaze and sunk in the same area by the navy.
Throughout this period of intense military activity in the ‘East’, elsewhere in the country the undeclared war between the security forces and the LTTE took various forms. The Forward Defence Lines (FDL) of the government-controlled areas in Jaffna peninsula were the venues of persistent but low intensity confrontations mainly in the form of either artillery bombardment from bases on both sides of the ‘frontier’ and clashes engendered by the occasional LTTE attempts by LTTE to cross the ‘frontier’ and enter the peninsula. In the coastal areas of Mannar District and in localities adjacent to the FDL in Vavuniya District, army killings of suspected insurgents, on the one hand, and LTTE claymore-mine attacks and ambushes of army patrols, on the other, occurred in almost routine fashion. The LTTE also maintained its strategy of bombing civilian targets in the ‘South’ more or less at the same tempo as in earlier times. Among these, several bombs detonated inside omnibuses (at Nittambuwa in the Western Province on 5 January 2007, at Godagama in the Southern Province on the following day, in Ampara on 2 April, and in Vavuniya town on 6 April) and caused, in aggregate, death and injury to about 80 persons. Potentially more destructive Tiger attacks on civilian targets appear to have been thwarted due to the detection at highway checkpoints of thousands of kilograms of explosives being transported from the LTTE-held areas in the Vanni towards Greater Colombo. To the LTTE what continued to be the most ominous challenge were the frequent air attacks on targets identified by the air force as military installations in the Vanni.
The damage and destruction inflicted by the LTTE on Sri Lanka through military offensives, diversionary tactics and terror attacks, though not inconsequential, have also not curtailed the capacity of the armed forces of the government to defend the country. Unlike over certain spells in the past, the security forces are being provided with inspiring leadership. A steady supply of weapons and equipment is being maintained. The morale is reported to be high. In contrast, it would be well neigh impossible for the LTTE to recover from the setbacks it has suffered since mid-2006. The proscriptions of the LTTE (and even some of its front organisations) in almost all the countries where there are sizeable expatriate Sri Lanka Tamil populations, the greater vigilance over its illegal arms transaction in at least some of the countries where there are clandestine arms markets, the strengthened Indo-Lankan collaboration in coastal surveillance and exchanges of security information, and the substantially increased operational capacity of the Sri Lanka navy (repeated interceptions of arms shipments), have converged to make it more difficult than ever before for the LTTE to engage in bulk procurement of arms and ammunition to replenish its arsenal. The replacement of the personnel losses is probably even more problematic. The densely populated coastal lowlands of the east where there is a large and impoverished Tamil population are no longer the brim-full reservoir of young conscripts to the Tiger cadres; and the forest-clad Vanni which has remained under the LTTE jackboot has hardly ever been a significant source of fresh recruits.
From the viewpoint of morale what probably constituted the most devastating blow administered on the LTTE occurred on Friday, 2 November 2007, shortly after 6.00 a.m., when Kfir and Mig fighter jets of the Sri Lanka Air Force bombed a target in a forested locality at Thiruvai Aru south of the township of Kilinochchi. According to information released by the Tiger high-command, six of its cadres including S P Thamilchelvam, Head of the LTTE ‘Political Wing’, were killed by the bombing. In the more recent past there have been reports of a bombardment by the Air Force in the north which is believed to have caused serious injury to the Tiger leader Prabhakaran.
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A Message - from H.L.de Silva
Ladies and gentlemen, first of all, may I thank the Members of PROTECT SRI LANKA for inviting me to send a brief message on this momentous occasion, when the Website of the Group is being launched on the Inter-Net. This is an important venture of the Group, comprising as it does of several patriotic citizens of Sri Lanka. It fulfills a long-felt need for a forum, for the study in depth, of the vital issues that affect our Nation and the various ramifications involved in undertaking strategic initiatives We feel this to be very necessary as the viewpoints and aspirations of a significant segment of opinion in the Country is not being adequately and effectively conveyed to the Nation, amidst the Babel of voices that unceasingly continue to assail our ears and confuse us because of their contradictory nature.
I think, at this juncture of the Island’s history, when there appears to be a powerful convergence of forces of diverse kinds and varying intensity at work in the international arena, it is the bounden duty of every patriotic citizen to consider carefully and soberly the various issues and dilemmas that confront us. Amidst the swirling waves of hostile forces around us, we need to stand steadfast and firm, support and rally round the State and lend every form of help to ensure the safety of the realm and the security of our People to avert the disasters, about which many doomsday Cassandras among us, endlessly continue to prattle and prophesy. Nor should we be distracted by the incessant babble of some pettifogging newspaper columnists and their pernickety points about such trivialities as the withdrawal of surplus security vehicles of Ministers who seem to be in perpetual motion on the highway and not working at their desks, or about the imagined dire consequences that would follow the abrogation of the infamous Cease Fire Agreement of February 2002 and its supposed adverse consequences for the “Peace Process” which after a few feeble and convulsive gasps, in several bids to reach agreement with the LTTE, now lies inert, like a patient etherized on a table.
If you would permit me at this point a short diversion, considering the vast amount of time and space, and the froth and bubble, that has poured forth on what is in reality a non-issue, namely, the abrogation of the CFA, I wish to say a word about this gigantic hoax that was perpetrated on the People of this Country, and the euphoria that it generated for a while. Despite it being a nullity from the commencement, never ratified by the then Executive President and Parliament, despite it lacking any degree of legitimacy whatsoever, and the serious inroads it made on our sovereignty, this monstrosity appears to have had the stranglehold of an anaconda on our political leadership, for six long years, until President Rajapakse decided to end this charade, despite the warning shots that were fired across the bow before it was done.
While the CFA lasted, because of the recognition given to its de facto existence and despite its unconstitutionality, the LTTE derived enormous advantages and benefits which enabled them freedom of movement outside their area of control, to consolidate their hold on the People, enabled them to infiltrate the adjacent territory, facilitated the smuggling of arms, gave them opportunities to assassinate state agents engaged in military intelligence and key political figures in the Country who were an obstacle to their plans and create the façade of a de facto state. No credible reasons for their opposition have been adduced by the Western Powers, for the veiled threats of interference, except the spurious ground that it would impede the realization of Peace, which assumes that it is the LTTE alone who matter and determine the issue. For the West, that habitually tilts in favour of the LTTE, it would appear that peace in Sri Lanka is only attainable upon the surrender of the State to the demands of the fascist L.T.T.E The habitual use of that weasel phrase – “ on terms acceptable to the Tamils” is the euphemism that is used to conceal their ulterior motives.
The West is under no illusion as to the nature of the LTTE as one of the deadliest terrorist organizations in the World. Does the “War against Terrorism” exclude them from its scope because they are not an immediate threat to the West? We cannot ascribe any intelligent explanation for the implied request that we should come to terms with the LTTE, except the manifest double standards in judgment and considerations of real politique when it comes to the application of moral and ethical standards of conduct universally accepted by the civilized world. In this connection It is with some degree of sadness that I have to say that even the standard bearers of righteous conduct among us here in Sri Lanka, seem to have conveniently forgotten, if not altogether jettisoned, the great traditions of moral and spiritual truths proclaimed by St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, in regard to the doctrine of the Just War.
No man in his senses, who is concerned about his fellow human beings, unless he be sadistically inclined or an unscrupulous war monger, would refuse to acknowledge the establishment of a durable peace as an urgent need and work towards an end of the conflict as soon as possible. But it is also our responsibility and obligation to assess realistically the likelihood and probabilities of the successful achievement of such endeavour in the near future. If attempted in haste and regardless of the negative factors and impediments that lie in our path, we would be doomed to disappointment and such unsuccessful efforts can only worsen the present situation. To imagine that this land in which a prolonged conflict has lasted for nearly 30 years, would be miraculously transformed to a haven of peace and tranquility – would be a utopian dream. The return to peace would not be an easy achievement, but may turn out to be as painful an experience as a journey through the wilderness that has to be undertaken with patience and forbearance.
There are in my opinion, two formidable obstacles that we must face with honesty and fortitude without glossing over them, if we are not to be overcome by initial failures. The first is the primary question as to the identity and the genuinely representative character of that body or association of Sri Lankan citizens who are willing and qualified to act on behalf of the Sri Lankan Tamil People, who have for centuries been a constituent element that was part of the very core of the Sri Lankan Nation. Such a body simply does not appear to exist. at present. To put it quite plainly, the Government of Sri Lanka does not have the moral right, however expedient it may seem, to regard the LTTE as having any legitimacy and as a trustworthy party with acceptable credentials to represent the Tamil People and speak on their behalf, merely because of their military skill and determination.
Had the LTTE ever sought to secure the consent of the Tamil People in pursuance of the hopeless quest to seize by force of conquest one-third of this Country, in order to set up a Separate State, because of the non-fulfillment of the inordinate political demands and aspirations of a certain elite group among them, now fortunately in a state of eclipse, regardless of the suffering and misery that the majority would have had to undergo in the achievement of this romantic dream? What is even more deserving of condemnation is the refusal of the LTTE, on pain of death, to allow the Tamil People, on whose behalf it purports to act, to express any contrary view let alone oppose, as is their undoubted right, the disastrous course of seeking to break away from the State of which they have formed an integral part for over a thousand years. “Self determination” has in reality no meaning for the Tamils in such a climate of fear and intimidation, if its exercise involves “self destruction”.
The LTTE would not permit the expression of a contrary view because they know full well that the Tamil People, if permitted to freely declare their wishes, would now decidedly reject this quixotic venture and accept a reasonable settlement. Any one who expects the Government to negotiate with the LTTE on behalf of the Tamils would then have to assume that the Government would be so foolish, heartless and irresponsible as to entrust the future of this long suffering section of its People, to a band of reckless and ruthless megalomaniacs. This is completely unacceptable.
When the U.S. and the Co-Chairs exhort the Government to negotiate, in the absence, at present, of any other visible party or group of persons on the horizon to represent the Tamils, they must be presumed to request negotiations with the LTTE who, in spite of widespread condemnation, they seem to consider as a proper party for negotiating a political settlement. Do they really think it unobjectionable, even commendable to reward the most brutal group of terrorists in the world, with the reins of government in a part of the Country and accede to their wishes merely because they happen to be now in de facto control? That kind of “political realism” is a negation of all moral values. This is but another instance, of their double standards and warrants instant rejection. That I believe is an essential part of the Government’s logic in pursuing the so-called military option, to ensure that the LTTE ceases to be an obstacle in arriving at a settlement and not to seek revenge for the harm done to the Country. If in consequence the whole Nation is obliged to undergo the trauma of suffering on a massive scale that is an inescapable reality we have to face. The alternative would be subjugation and prolonged oppression of the People by the LTTE.
Secondly, It seems to me quite impractical and wholly unrealistic for those calling for an instant solution to the political problem of governance, to think that any “quick fixes”, as have been suggested, would withstand the hostile forces that seek to subvert and derail any plans for peace and the transition to orderly government. There is no ground or justification for such rosy optimism. The restoration of peace and the complete stoppage of violence and the emergence of a truly democratic system recognizing pluralist values would take a fair length of time. It would take a while before the first practical measures towards inter-ethnic reconciliation are successfully undertaken by both sides, with sincerity, proper understanding and empathy. So it seems to me, to attempt to draft legal documents without adequate preparation and study of the ground conditions and educating the People, who would be called upon to run the institutions of government in the affected areas, is not a realistic approach and is unlikely to yield the expected results.
It is only when the LTTE has been neutralized and has ceased to be the dreaded force it is to-day – a modern day Leviathan ravaging the land and destroying for ever the precious lives and aspirations of thousands of young children – indeed the flower of the Nation - on whom their parents base their hopes for the future to carry forward the great heritage of the Tamil People, that trust and confidence in a stable peace would be restored. It is only when the physical security and freedom of expression for the Tamils is assured, that the authentic representatives of the Tamil People would emerge from their seclusion to declare their true interests. It is not the self-seeking politicians, nor the newspaper columnists who seek to foist on us their own pet political theories, nor the Tamil Diaspora ensconced in prestigious employment and living in comfort abroad, like the powerful Jewish Diaspora of America, who no longer have any desire or interest to return to their ancient homeland, or the scores of self-appointed advisers funded by foreign NGOs who have no stake in the Country, who can decide on the future of the Tamil People. The authentic voice of the real stakeholders has yet to be heard. It is only then that the Government will come to learn and appreciate their real needs. It is only then that any constitutional scheme can provide a lasting solution and satisfy their aspirations. To seek to implant an instant political solution fashioned in alien lands or at their dictation, to suit the Big Powers of the West who have long-term agendas to sub serve their own national interests, will not be successful.
At the same time the incontrovertible fact has to be recognized that after nearly twenty five years of violent activity in the North and East, there would still survive a significant remnant of the LTTE and their fellow travellers who would, despite defeat, find it hard to reconcile themselves to a realization that the romantic dream of Tamil Eelam has ended. History shows that any separatist ideology that has existed for years lingers on and takes a long time a-dying. Despite the restoration of democracy, the Rule of Law and the normalization of relations between the two groups, the pernicious seeds of secession would not disappear or die in a brief space of time. In fashioning a political framework, therefore, we must be ever vigilant against the recrudescence of centrifugal forces that may once again revive in full vigour, unless we provide for corrective mechanisms of a remedial nature, rather than any of a repressive kind. Such salutary measures alone can preserve the integrity of our Nation and ensure for us all a stable peace and that ideal state of well-being – Shalom, for which we all yearn.
Thank You.
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An Assessment of the Current Crisis among the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam by Prof. G.H.Peiris
Jane’s Information Group, UK (22 March 2004)
Revolt against the ‘God’
“We look to you as our god. We are not leaving you. We are not opposed to you. … (But) I do not want to commit the blunder of not pointing out to you the aspirations of our people in disregard of their feelings and those of our fighters here. … I want to do my duty by the people of Southern Thamil Eelam. It is my final goal that I should fight for these people and die at their feet”. So wrote Vinayanamoorthi Muralitharan, alias ‘Colonel Karuna’, the military wing leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the Eastern Province districts of Batticaloa and Ampara, in a letter he addressed on 3 March 2004 to his supreme chief Veluppillai Prabhakaran at the LTTE headquarters in the Northern Province township of Kilinochchi.
The letter was evidently a response from Karuna to an order from Prabhakaran for the transfer of one-thousand armed cadres operating under Karuna’s command in the Eastern Province to the ‘Vanni’, the LTTE-controlled area of the Northern Province. The letter, published the following day in the form of a pamphlet distributed in the Eastern Province, contained a firm refusal to obey the order for the transfer of troops, and a list of grievances against the Tiger leadership along with a rationalisation of Karuna’s defiant stand. It claimed that, though the Eastern Province (referred to, for the first time, as the “Southern Thamil Eelam”) had made disproportionately high contributions towards the LTTE’s secessionist efforts - those from the East killed in military confrontations in the North allegedly numbering well over 4,500 - it has tended to be neglected in the rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts initiated after the Sri Lanka government-LTTE ceasefire of December 2001. The letter asserted that the LTTE high command has continued to discriminate against activists from the East in making appointments to key military, political and administrative posts in the LTTE-held areas. It also contained two other charges potentially more harmful in their repercussions. The northern leaders, according to Karuna, enjoy a life of luxury, grabbing the material benefits that accrue from the flow of foreign aid for the development of the war-ravaged areas, while the cadres from the East continue to be confined to the arduous security duties far away from their homes, the two-year old ceasefire notwithstanding. Even more damagingly, Karuna charged that the forced conscription of children into the fighting cadres of the LTTE, the spate of attacks on contestants from non-LTTE political groups of the Eastern Province in the national parliamentary elections scheduled for 2 April 2004, and various other forms of violence including murder and extortion (all of which have evoked condemnation from some of the diplomatic missions in Sri Lanka and detracted from the LTTE’s attempts at gaining international respectability) is the work of those from the north operating in the Eastern Province under the direction of Pottu Amman, the chief of the Tiger Intelligence Unit, independently of Karuna, and (implicitly) with the approval of Prabhakaran.
Karuna’s letter, though initially trivialised for the world outside by the Tiger leaders at Kilinochchi as an internal dispute of no consequence, undoubtedly evoked among them intense anger and indignation. The type of open and calculated defiance which the letter represented was unprecedented in the annals of the LTTE at least since the organisation came under the control of Prabhakaran in 1976. Indeed, one of the main ingredients of Prabhakaran’s unchallenged supremacy has throughout been his capacity to command absolute obedience from his subordinates, and the ferocity with which he has dealt with renegades, his rivals, or with any other force that stood in his way.
It is in this backdrop that a series of harsh retaliatory measures taken by Prabhakaran following the receipt of Karuna’s letter could be understood. He dismissed Karuna from the post of military commander in Batticaloa and Ampara districts. He recalled Karuna and all other LTTE officers manning key posts in the Eastern Province to Kilinochchi. He placed those suspected of being Karuna loyalists serving in the Vanni area under strict surveillance (there were unconfirmed reports of some among them being executed). He summoned to the Vanni headquarters Sivasubramaniam Varathan alias ‘Pathuman’, the head of the LTTE military units in Trincomalee District, and a close associate of Karuna, and placed him in detention. Soon thereafter Prabhakaran initiated an inquiry against Karuna on charges of betrayal, misuse of funds, and moral turpitude.
The conciliatory embellishments in his letter of 3 March notwithstanding, measures that Karuna himself took soon after the dispatch of the letter leave no room to doubt that what he intended to achieve was, if not a complete break-away from the LTTE, at least a drastic change in his relations with the LTTE leadership at Kilinochchi. On the same day Karuna’s secretary Banu Avalian contacted Lt. Gen. Balagalle, Commander of Sri Lanka’s armed forces stationed in Colombo, and requested that government troops manning the entry/exit points of the LTTE-controlled areas be ordered to prevent the movements of Tiger cadres to and from the Northern and Eastern provinces. More importantly, in the course of Avalian’s communications with the army commander he is reported to have disclosed Karuna’s intension of breaking ranks with the LTTE leadership and entering into a separate ceasefire agreement with the government. Avalian is also said to have informed the Norwegian embassy in Colombo that Karuna has established control over the LTTE areas of the east.
On 4 March 2003, Karuna summoned his senior political, military and intelligence wing loyalists for an emergency meeting at the LTTE regional office at Thennaham (located close to the Batticaloa-Trincomalee district border), made a series of fresh appointments to key posts in his area of control, ordered the expulsion from the east of senior LTTE cadres from the north, and arranged to seal-off all exit/entry points of the Batticaloa-Ampara area.
Over the next few days there were several developments that widened the Prabhakaran-Karuna breach. There was, first, an exodus of Prabhakaran loyalists from the Batticaloa-Ampara to the Vanni. Those who fled included all high-ranking LTTE officers of ‘northern origin’ – Karuna’s deputy Ramesh, Kausalyan, Ramanan, Keerthi, Gihaththan, Ram and Karikalan. Further, on Karuna’s part, there was an attempt to mobilise support for his revolt from the civilian population. That he achieved a remarkably high level of success in this attempt was indicated by several demonstrations of protest against the Vanni leadership – a public display of military prowess, enforcement of a day’s stoppage of civilian activities in urban areas (hartal), several processions and rallies, destruction of a consignment of the pro-LTTE newspaper Thamil Alai, and, more outrageously than all else, the burning of Prabhakaran in effigy. Large numbers of civilians, especially Tamils, participated in some of these demonstrations - amazing, given the fact that since many of these events were photographed and accorded much media publicity, their participants, identifiable individually, risked harsh retribution in the event of Prabhakaran re-establishing his control over the East.
Throughout these early days of the Karuna revolt, both sides maintained some space, albeit marginal, for a possible compromise. This was, at least in part, a response to hectic external interventions from various quarters such as representatives of the governments of Norway, Germany and Britain who were concerned mainly with preserving intact the on-going peace efforts, and influential Roman Catholic clergymen and prominent intellectuals including those of the Tamil diaspora, whose principal concern appears to be the wellbeing of the LTTE. Thus, for instance, Karuna, while remaining defiant, persisted with the claim that he would return to the fold if Prabhakaran were to expel several persons from the LTTE apex - Intelligence Chief Pottu Amman and the Head of the Political Wing Thamilchelvan - and if he were to be vested with authority over all LTTE affairs of the Eastern Province subject only to general direction by Prabhakaran. Likewise, Thamilchelvan, acting on behalf of Prabhakaran, offered Karuna amnesty and asylum in any part of the world provided he withdrew from the movement.
A further escalation of the crisis occurred with the outbreak of the news that on 6 March Prabhakaran had imposed death sentence on Karuna and “all other traitors”, and had dispatched killer squads to carry out the sentence. This resulted in several armed clashes. According to press reports in Colombo (denied, however, by Vanni spokesmen) Prabhakaran’s men suffered heavy casualties in a confrontation with Karuna loyalists on the night of 7 March in the northern parts of Batticaloa District where there has evidently been a further build-up of troops from the north.
Several statements made by Karuna on about 12 March in the course of an interview granted to the prestigious Indian daily, The Hindu, probably marked his absolute point of no return. He is reported to have disclosed that one of the main reasons for his decision to quit was the preparation being made by Prabhakaran to resume armed hostilities against the government of Sri Lanka in the event of a victory of the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) at the forthcoming parliamentary elections. While denouncing Prabhakaran’s belligerence, Karuna expressed the belief that the ‘Eelam objective’ is unattainable, given the lack of international support for the concept of an independent Tamil nation-state in the north-east of Sri Lanka. He blamed the Tiger cadres working in the Eastern Province under Pottu Amman for all the acts of violence (murder, abduction, extortion, harassment of the Muslims) and all violations of the government-LTTE MOU. According to the editor of The Hindu (14 March), the most damaging “confession” made in the course of this interview was that it was Prabhakaran and Pottu Amman that masterminded the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 - the first time such an admission has been made by a Tiger leader concerning this horrendous crime.
Karuna’s Motivations and Impulses
Colonel Karuna was, until early March this year, one of only two persons at the apex of the Tiger hierarchy who could have been considered as representing the new generation in the LTTE elite. The Tiger leadership has, in general, continued to remain largely in the hands of the close-knit group from Jaffna peninsula of northern Sri Lanka - many of them hailing from the township of Velvettithurai on the northern coast - who, by the early 1980s, had acquired notoriety for their politically motivated brigandage and crime. It appears that Karuna, the teenager who joined the LTTE in the 1983, hailing as he does from a farmer family in the village of Kiran in Batticaloa District, never really belonged to the inner core of the LTTE from the north.
Soon after his entry into the LTTE ranks, Karuna received training in guerrilla warfare at a camp in Salem, South India - one of several such centres which the Indian government under late Indira Gandhi operated for promoting insurrection in northern Sri Lanka. Karuna’s appointment to the post of LTTE Military Wing leader for Batticaloa-Ampara in 1987 when barely 20 years old probably reflects both the recognition of his skills by the Tiger leadership as well as the relative insignificance of Batticaloa-Ampara during the 1980s as a centre of LTTE activity.
Karuna’s rise in the LTTE ranks during the 1990s was truly meteoric. He planned and executed many of the attacks on rival groups of Tamil militants. Among the other LTTE “victories” in the Eastern Province to which Karuna provided leadership were the execution of some 600 members of the Sri Lanka police who had surrendered to the LTTE on instructions from Colombo shortly after the collapse of peace negotiations undertaken by President Premadasa in July 1990; the gunning down of about 200 Muslims in surprise attacks on mosques at Eravur and Kattankudi carried out in the course of LTTE efforts of the early 1990s at making Eastern Province a part of the “exclusive Tamil homeland” through ethnic cleansing; and attacks on several Sinhalese villages located in proximity to the Eastern Province boundary decimating all inhabitants not sparing even the infants.
Karuna’s reputation as a ruthless fighter totally dedicated to the LTTE cause received a further boost in the period after the eviction of the LTTE from Jaffna peninsula by the Sri Lanka army in December 1995. Since the sparsely populated forest-clad Vanni region to which the LTTE leadership retreated provided little scope for finding new recruits, Batticaloa emerged in importance as the principal source of Tiger manpower. In these circumstances, Karuna recruited (sometimes forcibly) thousands of young men, women and children, trained them in guerrilla warfare, and despatched most of them to the north where the main military confrontations between the LTTE and the security forces of the government were taking place. Not infrequently, he was called upon to personally lead guerrilla attacks against military encampments of the government in the Vanni area. In 2000 Karuna was appointed the overall co-ordinator of the LTTE offensive named ‘Unceasing Waves III’, a massive and highly successful operation involving about 8,000 fighters. His crowning achievement as a guerrilla leader was the defeat he inflicted on the Sri Lanka army at the capture of the military base at Elephant Pass (located at the point of overland entry into Jaffna peninsula) in April of that year which, apart from causing heavy casualties among government troops and securing a strategic advantage, enriched the LTTE arsenal with a huge cache of weaponry. By this stage, as a battle-field hero, Karuna probably had no equal among the Tigers. He, it is said, figured among the trusted few admitted to Prabhakaran’s exalted presence while wearing a loaded revolver. Karuna’s prestige was such that he was also accorded the honour of serving as an LTTE delegate at several rounds of peace negotiation in 2002-03.
In the circumstances sketched out above Karuna’s revolt does appear somewhat strange unless one were to accept at face value his barely credible disclaimers of responsibility for excessive violence in the Eastern Province, his renunciation of the struggle for Eelam, his ardent commitment to the wellbeing of the people in the Eastern Province whom he professes to lead, and his denunciation of the avaricious lifestyle of the Vanni leaders. Admittedly, these could have caused genuine resentment in Karuna’s mind. Personal ambition for further elevation of power and status, coupled with jealousy at the prominence accorded by Prabhakaran to persons like Thamilchelvan whose contribution to the LTTE has not been readily evident, could also have added to Karuna’s resentment. But could this type of grievance have driven Karuna to a course of precipitate action that has the potential of destroying the entire LTTE edifice and what it has unyieldingly stood for, unless, as he would have been well aware, he and his loyalists are speedily destroyed to protect the edifice?
Speculatively, one could identify several other interrelated explanations for Karuna’s revolt, one of which is that it was a desperate pre-emptive move intended to forestall impending fall from grace and eventual destruction. It is possible that, with Karuna’s growing stature as a charismatic leader commanding loyalty from a large segment of LTTE’s armed cadres, he might have been seen as posing a threat to Prabhakaran’s supremacy. It could have been that, unlike most of the other second rung Tiger leaders operating in Vanni within easy reach of Prabhakaran’s tentacles and hence needing to perpetually genuflect in the course of their dealings with the chief, Karuna’s assertive and forthright ways caused displeasure and a desire on the part of the high command to cut him down to size. There is a possibility that Karuna might have felt the beginnings of an estrangement of relations with Prabhakaran several months earlier. For instance, in the course of an address to a large gathering of his troops on 17 March, Karuna is reported to have narrated an encounter at the Tiger headquarters in Kilinochchi the previous December in the course of which, according to him, Prabhakaran humiliated him in the presence of several others, accusing him of deviating from the LTTE stand, and that when he tried to explain his position, Balraj (effectively, Prabhakaran’s deputy since the demise of Mahattaya in 1994) rudely shouted him down. It is also of interest that Prabhakaran’s order for the transfer of one-thousand fighters from the east to the north which triggered off the revolt had been preceded by a similar order last September (with which Karuna complied) for the transfer of 750 fighters. Both these orders, given the absence of military necessity in the prevailing truce, could have been seen as being intended to weaken the Karuna faction prior to an impending purge.
Yet another explanation for the revolt is that Karuna himself realised the existence of both an objective need as well as a capacity to display independence from the Vanni leadership. The need stemmed from a perceived marginalisation. As for capacity, there are several relevant considerations. As Karuna himself has publicly asserted, about 5,000 trained cadres presently operate under his direct command and would remain loyal to him, which fact evidently makes a large-scale armed offensive against him unaffordable to the northern leadership. This assertion is in conformity with an observation recently made by one of the most authoritative Tiger-watchers in Sri Lanka, the journalist Iqbal Athas, according to which a greater part of the LTTE military build-up witnessed since the declaration of the ceasefire of December 2001 - procurement of arms and ammunition, and the increase in the number of trained fighters - has taken place in the Eastern Province, mostly in areas controlled by Karuna.
Similarly, the possibility that there have been external impulses for Karuna’s drastic move cannot be ruled out. An obvious weakness in his objective of creating and sustaining a territorial entity in the east that could exist independently of the Vanni leadership - a ‘Southern Thamil Eelam’ - relates to the problem of replenishment of his arsenal. It is known that both the flow of funds to the LTTE from outside the country as well as the LTTE’s links with external sources of arms and ammunition have hitherto been under the exclusive control of the Vanni high command. The fact that the location of arms stockpiles in the east is known to the leaders of the north is an added strategic advantage they possess in a possible armed offensive against the rebel. In these circumstances it seems unlikely for Karuna to have acted without some assurance of external assistance if needed. A possible source of such assistance is, of course, India which, though continuing to profess non-involvement in Sri Lanka’s conflict, has reason to desire a curtailment of Prabhakaran’s growing power and influence in the Sri Lanka polity. Over the past two weeks there has, in fact, been speculation that Delhi’s intelligence agency ‘Research and Analysis Wing’ (RAW) has actually instigated Karuna’s revolt.
Karuna’s decision to revolt against the LTTE leadership must surely have drawn strength from the ‘traditional’ resentment prevalent among the Tamils of the Eastern Province of being dominated and exploited by the Tamils from the north. To some extent this perception is a past legacy, and is rooted in the wide contrasts that prevailed between the two areas in living standards prior to the escalation of the ethnic conflict into a full scale secessionist insurrection in the 1980s. Jaffna District of the north, the largest concentration of Sri Lankan Tamils, ranked at that time among the most economically advanced areas of the country, being well ahead of almost all other districts when measured with any ‘indicator’ employed in comparative assessments of the physical quality of life - mortality rates, life expectancy, literacy, educational attainment, real income and consumption expenditure, etc. Batticaloa, the second major Tamil concentration, on the other hand, was among the least developed districts, peopled largely by an impoverished peasantry. Given their commonalities of language and religion, one of the main consequences of the contrast, especially the differences between the two districts pertaining to education and social mobility, was that a large segment of the upper income strata of the east - businessmen, landlords, professionals and others in salaried occupations - consisted of migrants from the north. Moreover, throughout the ‘modern period’ of Sri Lankan history, Tamil politics of the country continued to be dominated by the migrant Jaffna Tamil elite – a group that had gained ascendancy over the indigenous Tamil elite of the eastern lowlands which consisted of the so-called Mukkuwars and those of the local Vellala caste.
There is a thin scatter of evidence, admittedly inconclusive, to reinforce the contention that many Tamils of the Eastern Province (probably the majority) do not support one of the unyielding LTTE demands - namely, autonomy for a spatial entity comprising the Northern and Eastern provinces. At the parliamentary elections of 1977 (the last occasion on which there was an entirely free and fair parliamentary election in the ‘north-east’) the Tamil United Liberation Front/TULF which sought a popular mandate for their policy commitment to the establishment of an independent Tamil state - Eelam - comprising the Northern and Eastern provinces, it secured only 30.6% of the vote from all electorates of the Eastern Province (with only 45.4% from Batticaloa District), though Tamils accounted for almost 43% of the total of voters in the province. A more persuasive set of statistical evidence for this view could be found in the summary results of a survey published in the January 15, 2000 issue of the London-based Tamil Times. This survey, conducted in November-December 1999 by ‘Research International’ for the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, was based on a structured random sample of 2,994 respondents representative of all areas and ethnic groups of Sri Lanka, and was designed to quantify public opinion on a range of issues concerning the country’s ethnic conflict. To confine ourselves here to the aspect salient to the present issue, the survey showed that in Batticaloa District (where Tamils constitute 70% of the population) only 14% favoured an outright merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces in a negotiated settlement of the ethnic conflict. To cite another snippet of opinion, a Tamil writer to the May 15, 1997 issue of this same journal asserted: “The Jaffna man even now does not consider the Tamils from the Eastern Province as his equal. He is hell-bent on maintaining his supremacy even at this critical time. I doubt seriously whether Jaffna Tamils and Eastern Province Tamils can ever have a sincere consensus on matters of common interest”.
It is the existence of this resentment of the east against the north that Karuna intended to tap in his efforts to mobilise popular support for his defiance of Prabhakaran and to thus vindicate his stand. This is why he publicised his emotionally charged letter of 3 March among the people of his area soon after it was dispatched to the LTTE headquarters in Vanni. And, this is why his charge of discrimination by the northern leadership against the east found favourable resonance in the civilian population of his area.
Impact of Karuna’s Revolt
It was with disbelief and bewilderment that most observers of Sri Lanka politics reacted to the outbreak of news about the rift in the LTTE. A serious challenge to Prabhakaran’s leadership from within the LTTE was so inconceivable that many did not rule out the possibility of the reported rift being an elaborate hoax intended to distract attention, especially that of the international community, from the increasing incidence of blatant violations of the MOU and of human rights norms by the LTTE. There were also those who recalled the tragic fate of Gopalasamy Mahendrarajah, alias Mahattaya, (Prabhakaran’s close friend and deputy until he was branded a traitor and executed in 1994), and said that if, indeed, there was a revolt in the LTTE, it will soon be suppressed. Even at present there is a lingering doubt, not so much about the reality of the revolt, but about its sustainability.
The possible consequences of the Karuna revolt could be examined under three distinct but interrelated aspects - namely, its impact on (a) electoral politics of Sri Lanka in the context of the impending parliamentary elections and the related responses and reactions of the main political forces of the country, (b) the durability of the on-going ceasefire and the prospects for a resumption of peace negotiations between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, and (c) the future of the LTTE. Needless to stress, reasoned speculation and conjecture is unavoidable in a commentary on all these aspects.
(a) Impact of the Revolt on Electoral Politics
For the Colombo government, information on the revolt posed the dilemma that anything it does or fails to do could go wrong in regard to both preserving the ceasefire agreement with the LTTE intact as well as the prospects of the two segments of the government presently at fierce competition with each other in their respective campaigns leading to the parliamentary elections of 2 April 2004. For instance, while recognition of Karuna as de facto rebel leader of Batticaloa-Ampara or even granting one of his lesser requests would constitute a breach of the MOU and is likely to evoke Prabhakaran’s wrath, non-recognition of Karuna or a refusal of a request from him could well result in a violent retaliation from his loyalists of the Eastern Province. Similarly, any step taken either by President Kumaratunga (leader of the United People’s Freedom Alliance / UPFA), or by her political rival Prime Minister Wickremasinghe (leader of the United National Front / UNF) in relation to the changed scenario in the ‘north-east’ of the country could have a decisive impact upon the extent of support they could mobilise from the Tamil community at the polls and, thus, the final outcome of the elections.
In any event the overall impact of the Prabhakaran-Karuna split on the forthcoming parliamentary elections is likely to be profound. Over the past few months, probably in anticipation of a national poll, the LTTE high-command engineered the formation of a ‘Tamil National Alliance’ (TNA) consisting of almost all Tamil political parties in mainstream politics. At the nomination of contestants, it was the LTTE head-office that selected the TNA candidates for the electoral districts of the Northern and Eastern provinces. The objective of these manoeuvres has been that, if the LTTE could ensure the victory of its handpicked candidates - there is, indeed, no doubt whatever that it has the capacity to do so, employing intimidation and threat, and various other forms of rigging the poll - it would have at least about 20 members in the new parliament to serve as its puppets. In view of the fact that under the prevailing system of ‘proportional representation’ neither the UPFA nor the UNF could obtain anything more than a slender majority in the 225-member parliament, the LTTE leadership, having 20 members at its beck and call, could then have a decisive say over the affairs of the country’s legislature. In pursuance of this strategy the LTTE has, since the nomination day, already murdered a contestant and an activist in the Eastern Province from parties opposed to the TNA, and induced several other candidates to withdrawn from the contest.
Moreover, there is a clear preference of the LTTE leadership for a victory of the UNF, and a barely concealed understanding that the LTTE-controlled TNA members would support the UNF in parliament. The LTTE, its announced willingness to conduct future negotiations with any party returned to office at the elections notwithstanding, is firmly opposed to the UPFA whose manifesto contains a categorical commitment to oppose any future constitutional change that accommodates the concept of an ‘exclusive traditional homeland’ of the Tamils in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka - a core demand of the LTTE. Moreover, given the fact that on the eve of the presidential election of December 1999 the LTTE attempted to assassinate President Kumaratunga and was almost successful in that attempt, Karuna’s charge that Prabhakaran was preparing for a resumption of armed hostilities against the government in the event of the UPFA victory cannot be summarily dismissed. The least one could say on this charge is that it could have been intended to intimidate the Sinhalese segment of the electorate into supporting the UNF. The charge that there exists a clandestine agreement in this regard between the UNF and the LTTE is not entirely devoid of substance.
Karuna’s revolt has completely transformed the electoral scenario outlined above. Over the past few days Karuna summoned all TNA candidates of Batticaloa-Ampara to a meeting at his headquarters, and instructed | | |
